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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010 Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act,1 a comprehensive legislative response to the 
market crash of 2008.2  Dodd-Frank is a major initiative aimed at 
strengthening and expanding the existing regulatory structure under which 
financial markets operate.3  In that respect, Dodd-Frank is not unique.  
 
* Senior Editor, Volume 164, University of Pennsylvania Law Review. J.D. Candidate, 
2016, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.S., 2013, Duke University. I would like to 
thank Professor David Skeel for his insightful comments throughout the writing process, 
and my friends at the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law for their 
collective effort in bringing this work to publication. 
 1.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 7, 12, 
15, 22, 26, 28, 31, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 2.  See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON 
REG. 91, 96 (2012) (“The Dodd-Frank Act was the government’s historic response to the 
causes of the economic crisis.”). 
 3.  See Dodd-Frank Act, 124 Stat. at 1376 (setting the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act as 
that to “promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system”); see also Barr, supra note 2, at 92 (asserting that 
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Rather, it continues a long-standing pattern of remedial Congressional 
action following major systemic failures shaking the economy.  The most 
significant instances of such governmental intervention were the enactment 
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 19344 following the Great 
Depression, and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20025 in response to the Dot-
Com Crash.  Much the same way, Dodd-Frank was intended to build on 
existing legislation to remedy the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, and 
provide strong compliance and reporting incentive structures to prevent 
future market failures.  One of the ways Congress sought to achieve this 
was by “expanding and strengthening corporate whistleblower 
protections”6 through Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provision.7 
Years before enacting the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress had recognized 
the need to afford protections to whistleblowers as part of a broad scheme 
aimed at protecting financial markets.  Industrialization in the United States 
was coupled with an increase in the frequency and scale of corporate fraud, 
which at times resulted in severe systemic problems.8  One of the latest 
instances of the far-reaching effects of fraud on the financial system prior 
to the adoption of Dodd-Frank was the stock market crash of 2002 
following years of undetected accounting manipulation.9  The largest fraud 
cases were revealed thanks to the internal and external disclosures of 
several corporate employees, including the Vice President of Enron, 
Sherron Watkins.10  The long-sustained violations, coupled with the 
whistleblowers’ contributions in exposing the persistent unlawful activity, 
prompted Congress to step in and enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the first 
federal attempt at providing comprehensive uniform reporting protections.11  
Its whistleblower provision covered both internal and external disclosures 
 
Dodd-Frank was enacted as a response to Congress’s conviction that “financial institutions 
cannot be left to regulate themselves, and that without clear rules, transparency, and 
accountability, financial markets break down, sometimes catastrophically”).   
 4.  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-pp (2012). 
 5.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
 6.  Samuel C. Leifer, Protecting Whistleblower Protections in the Dodd-Frank Act, 
113 MICH. L. REV. 121, 131 (2014). 
 7.  § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)) (“The Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . is amended by inserting . . . ‘Sec. 21F. Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection.’”). 
 8.  Robert E. Freer, Jr. & Raymond W. Burroughs, Unintended Consequences: 
Sarbanes-Oxley and its Progeny, 7 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 47, 50 (2010). 
 9.  See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 10.  Freer, supra note 8, at 51. 
 11.  Valerie Watnick, Whistleblower Protections Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A 
Primer and a Critique, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 831, 842 (2007). 
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in an attempt to prevent future financial crises.12  The imperfections of the 
Act, however, made the market crash of 2008 possible.  In response, 
Congress attempted to expand the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower 
protections in the Dodd-Frank Act.13 
Unfortunately, the statute has presented an inherent ambiguity in 
delineating who is protected from employer retaliation after blowing the 
whistle.  Section 922, the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision, defines a 
whistleblower as “any individual who provides . . . information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, 
by rule or regulation, by the Commission.”14  Read in isolation, the 
whistleblower definition seems to indicate that only disclosures to the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) are protected under Section 
922.  However, the statute then outlines three types of disclosures protected 
from retaliation.  The prohibition against retaliation provides that 
employers may not discharge whistleblowers for (1) giving information to, 
or (2) assisting the SEC in investigations, or (3) “in making disclosures that 
are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . and any other 
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”15  
Since internal disclosure—made within a company rather than directly to 
the SEC—is protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,16 the third prong, 
read in isolation, indicates that those who choose to report a violation 
internally are also protected from retaliation under the Dodd-Frank Act.  
The difficulty surfaces when one attempts to interpret the broad anti-
retaliation provision in light of the narrow whistleblower definition. 
In 2011 the SEC issued a regulation to clarify the ambiguity.17  The 
SEC ruled that while the narrow definition applies to whistleblowers 
seeking monetary awards, the anti-retaliation provision covers three classes 
of whistleblowers, including those who make internal disclosures.18  In 
spite of the SEC regulation, courts have remained divided on the issue.  
While the Second Circuit and district courts in California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Nebraska, New York, Massachusetts, and Tennessee have 
adopted the broad reading espoused by the SEC,19 the Fifth Circuit has 
refused to defer to the SEC interpretation and has limited the anti-
 
 12.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002). 
 13.  See Leifer, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 14.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6) (2010) (emphasis added). 
 15.  Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A). 
 16.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002). 
 17.  Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13, 
2011).   
 18.  Id. at 34304. 
 19.  See infra notes 40, 46-48 and accompanying text. 
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retaliation protection exclusively to external disclosures.20 
This Comment argues that the narrow interpretation defies 
congressional intent and runs contrary to the goal of incentivizing 
disclosure and responsible business practices.  Additionally, instead of 
achieving the goal of strengthening the incentives promoted by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the narrow interpretation has the potential to 
undermine the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection, and lead to even 
less disclosure than before the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. 
Part I provides a brief account of the history leading up to the adoption 
of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision.  Part II presents the ambiguity 
of the statute and the SEC interpretation.  Part III introduces the circuit split 
in light of the statutory interpretation framework adopted by the Supreme 
Court in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.21  
Part III also analyzes the narrow and broad approaches, arguing for the 
adoption of the broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision.  First, 
a proper Chevron analysis leads to the conclusion that the statute is 
ambiguous in light of the statutory text and legislative intent.  Second, the 
SEC interpretation is reasonable and should therefore be granted deference 
under Chevron.  Part IV argues that adopting a narrow interpretation risks 
undermining the Sarbanes-Oxley anti-retaliation provision, which the 
Dodd-Frank Act sought to strengthen and expand. 
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Congress has long recognized the need to provide whistleblower 
protections to encourage employees to come forward with information that 
could help prevent, unearth, and discipline securities fraud.  The steady 
growth in the size and complexity of American corporations throughout the 
twentieth century, coupled with the workings of the U.S. capital markets, 
has consistently rewarded and so contributed to the increase of risk-taking 
behavior, which has often been misguided and unlawful, and at times led to 
major systemic failures.22  Such failures have historically been difficult to 
prevent as employees have had little reason to report violations witnessed 
in the workplace.  Prior to 2002, whistleblowers “had to rely on the 
‘vagaries’ of state law for protection [and] most corporate employers knew 
exactly what they could do within state law to avoid a suit by a 
 
 20.  See infra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 21.  467 U.S. 837 (1984) (outlining a two-part test for statutory interpretation). 
 22.  See generally DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM (David Kairys ed. 2005) 
(providing recent examples of the pernicious effects of the trend toward excessive risk-
taking labeled as “Icaran” after the legendary risk-taker Icarus). 
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whistleblowing employee.”23  As a result of the lack of meaningful 
protections, violations remained undetected for years, and ultimately made 
the stock market crash of 2002 possible.24  The uncovering of nearly half a 
decade of fraud was largely due to the bravery of several employees of 
large corporations who reported their concerns to management and the 
SEC.  In August of 2001, Enron’s Vice President Sherron Watkins warned 
CEO Ken Lay of a series of improper accounting practices that later forced 
the company into bankruptcy.25  Subsequently, a number of former 
WorldCom employees reported suspicions of similar accounting violations, 
later confirmed by the SEC.26  These and several other corporate scandals 
led to the decline in investor confidence and the ultimate collapse of the 
stock market.27 
As the events unfolded, Congress recognized the need for better and 
uniform reporting protections, and it enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in an 
attempt to prevent another market collapse.28  The whistleblower provision 
covered internal and external disclosures, and forbade retaliation against 
both.29  Congress’s decision to protect internal reporting was justified by a 
number of advantages it offered, including relieving some of the pressure 
from the SEC, enhancing the efficiency of internal controls, and avoiding 
the waste of corporate and governmental resources where the suspicions 
proved unwarranted.30  However, Congress’s execution of that policy 
objective was imperfect.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s whistleblower provision 
arguably provided insufficient protections to offset the risk of a job loss, 
coupled with a set of procedural hurdles further discouraging disclosure.31  
Some believe that the availability of monetary incentives undermined 
internal compliance programs by encouraging employees to leave 
violations uncorrected in order to report to the SEC and obtain an award.32  
Partly as a result of the inadequacies of Sarbanes-Oxley, only six years 
after the Act’s adoption, the nation suffered the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression.33  Congress’s response was the adoption of the Dodd-
 
 23.  Watnick, supra note 11. 
 24.  See infra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 25.  Freer, supra note 8, at 51. 
 26.  Id. at 51–52. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 29.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2002). 
 30.  For a more comprehensive discussion on the benefits of protecting internal 
disclosure, see infra notes 137-143 and accompanying text. 
 31.  See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
 32.  Steve Spivack & Erin Sullivan, The SEC Whistleblower Program: What 
Companies Need to Know, 21 BUS. CRIMES BULL., no. 7, Mar. 2014, at 3. 
 33.  See generally GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS: THE 
CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS (2008) (characterizing the 2008 market crash 
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Frank Act.34  Its goal was to build on and strengthen the protections of 
Sarbanes-Oxley, and thus prevent another systemic collapse.35  Its success 
in achieving that goal has recently been threatened by the Fifth Circuit’s 
refusal to recognize the internal whistleblower protections. 
II. THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER PROVISION AND THE 
SEC INTERPRETATION 
The language of the Dodd-Frank Act presents an internal 
inconsistency between the whistleblower definition and the anti-retaliation 
provision.  Section 922, titled “Whistleblower Protection,” begins with the 
general statement that it amends the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.36  
The statute then lays out a list of definitions applying to the remainder of 
the section.  A whistleblower is defined as “any individual who 
provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the 
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the 
Commission.”37  That definition read in isolation, therefore, seems to 
clearly and unambiguously indicate that only individuals making 
disclosures of suspected violations directly to the SEC enjoy the 
protections of Section 922.  However, Section 922 then continues by 
outlining three instances in which retaliation is forbidden.  The anti-
retaliation provision states: 
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, 
harass, directly or indirectly, or in any other manner 
discriminate against, a whistleblower in the terms and 
conditions of employment because of any lawful act 
done by the whistleblower— 
(i) in providing information to the Commission in 
accordance with this section;  
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any 
investigation or judicial or administrative action of the 
Commission based upon or related to such information; 
or 
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected 
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .38 
A quick consultation with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reveals that under 
 
as the worst one since the mid-30s). 
 34.  See supra notes 2-3. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  § 922(a), 124 Stat. at 1841 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)). 
 37.  Id. § 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
 38.  Id. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).  
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subsection (iii) the protection applies to any employee who has reported to 
the SEC, Congress, or “a person with supervisory authority over the 
employee.”39  Therefore, the third prong of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation 
provision, read in isolation, seems to clearly and unambiguously define 
three categories of whistleblowers protected from retaliation, including 
those who make internal disclosures.  Read together, however, the 
whistleblower definition contained in § 78u-6(a)(6) and the anti-retaliation 
provision in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) present a textual inconsistency within the 
statute.  The resulting confusion is centered on the inclusiveness of the 
whistleblower anti-retaliation protection; namely, whether coverage 
extends to all employees disclosing securities laws violations, or only to 
those reporting to the SEC. 
The direct clash between § 78u-6(a)(6) and § 78u-6(h)(1)(A) proved 
confusing for courts almost immediately.  The court in Egan v. 
TradingScreen was the first to address the issue in dicta, suggesting that 
internal disclosures are covered by the anti-retaliation provision.40 
In 2011, in an attempt to clarify the ambiguity, the SEC promulgated a 
final rule addressing the issue of eligibility both for a monetary award and 
for anti-retaliation protection under Section 922.41  The rule provides that a 
public company employee is a whistleblower protected from retaliation if 
he or she has “a reasonable belief” that the reported information “relates to 
a possible securities law violation,” and the disclosure is made as described 
by § 78u-6(h)(1)(A), the anti-retaliation provision.42  The rule further 
clarifies that a whistleblower, as described above, enjoys protection from 
retaliation regardless of whether he or she also qualifies as a whistleblower 
for a monetary award under the bounty program.43  Therefore, the SEC 
resolved the apparent conflict by adopting two distinct whistleblower 
definitions for the two distinct incentive provisions of Section 922.  To be 
eligible for the bounty program and entitled to a monetary award, a 
whistleblower is an employee who provides information to the 
Commission, as provided in § 78u-6(a)(6).44  However, for anti-retaliation 
protection purposes, the SEC defines three categories of whistleblowers, as 
 
 39.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1)(C) (2002) (emphasis added). 
 40.  No. 10 Civ. 8202 (LBS), 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5–6 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 
2011) (holding that the SEC had no jurisdiction in the case, but outlining four protected 
categories of disclosures under Dodd-Frank, including internal disclosures protected under 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 41.  Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300 (June 13, 
2011).   
 42.  Id. at 34363. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See id. (“To be eligible for an award, [an employee] must submit original 
information to the Commission . . . .”). 
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outlined in § 78u-6(h)(1)(A).45 
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND CHEVRON 
In spite of the SEC clarification on the issue, the confusion 
surrounding the definition of whistleblower under Dodd-Frank has 
continued.  On one hand, the Second Circuit and the majority of district 
courts have deferred to the SEC interpretation and adopted the broad 
reading of the anti-retaliation protection.  Just a few months after the final 
rule was published, the Nollner decision came out citing both Egan and the 
SEC rule to summarize in dicta that internal disclosures are covered under 
the anti-retaliation provision.46  California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Nebraska, New York, and Massachusetts soon followed course, holding for 
the first time that the broad whistleblower definition should apply to 
employees seeking protection from retaliation.47  Most recently, the Second 
Circuit in Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC concluded that “the pertinent 
provisions of Dodd-Frank create a sufficient ambiguity to warrant . . . 
deference to the SEC’s interpretive rule, which supports [the broad 
interpretation].”48  On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has consistently 
refused to follow the SEC interpretation, arguing that the statute 
unambiguously defines a whistleblower as someone who has provided 
information to the Commission, and that therefore the anti-retaliation 
provision only applies to external disclosures.49  While the two lines of 
 
 45.  See id. at 34304 (“[T]he statutory anti-retaliation protections apply to three 
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third category includes individuals who 
report to persons or governmental authorities other than the Commission.  Specifically, [§ 
78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)] provides anti-retaliation protections for employees [who report to] a 
person with supervisory authority over the employee . . . .”). 
 46.  Nollner v. S. Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 993–95 (M.D. Tenn. 
2012). 
 47.  Bussing v. COR Cleaning, LLC, 20 F. Supp. 3d 719 (D. Neb. 2014); Yang v. 
Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade 
Holding Corp., No. 13-4149(SDW)(MCA), 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 
2014); Connolly v. Remkes, No. 5:14-CV-01344-LHK, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 28, 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters Mkts. LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977 F. Supp. 2d (D. Mass. 2013); Murray v. 
UBS Securities, LLC, No. 12 Civ. 5914(JMF), 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084 (S.D.N.Y. May 
21, 2013); Genberg v. Porter, 935 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2013); Kramer v. Translux 
Corp., No. 3:11cv1424(SRU), 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012).  
 48.  801 F.3d 145, 146 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 49.  Asadi v. G.E. Energy United States, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013); see also 
Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 640, 646 (E.D. Wis. 2014) (holding 
that the statute is not ambiguous, and only those who fall within the definition of a 
whistleblower are entitled to protection); Englehart v. Career Educ. Corp., No. 8:14-cv-444-
T-33EAJ, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501, at *9 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2014) (holding that the 
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cases reach a different conclusion, both follow the same course of analysis.  
Since the dispute revolves around statutory interpretation, courts follow the 
two-part standard laid out in Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc.50  First, a court reviewing an agency’s construction of 
a statute needs to determine “[i]f the intent of Congress is clear.”51  If 
congressional intent is clear and unambiguous, the court must adhere to it 
regardless of the agency’s interpretation.52  If, however, “the statute is silent 
or ambiguous,” the court must grant the agency’s interpretation 
“controlling weight unless [it is] arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.”53  In Parts III.A and III.B I argue that, in light of the 
statutory text, the legislative history, and the goal of the Dodd-Frank Act, a 
court may not reasonably determine that Congress clearly and 
unambiguously sought to limit the anti-retaliation protection to external 
disclosures.  In Part III.C I argue that the SEC interpretation is reasonable 
and must therefore be adhered to. 
A. The Dodd-Frank Act’s Statutory Language and Structure Render 
the Whistleblower Provision Ambiguous 
Much of the disagreement over the interpretation of Section 922 lies in 
the conclusions courts have reached with respect to step one of Chevron.  
The Fifth Circuit, starting with Asadi, has consistently held that Congress 
clearly and unambiguously meant to protect only external whistleblowers 
from retaliation.54  The Second Circuit and the majority of district courts 
adopting the broad interpretation, on the other hand, have determined that 
the statute is inherently ambiguous.55  Both lines of cases, however, have 
predominantly focused on the text and structure of Section 922.  In 
 
plaintiff who had not provided information to the SEC was not a whistleblower because the 
Act unambiguously limited coverage to external disclosures); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F.3d 
749 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2013) (stating that the anti-retaliation provision only applies to 
external disclosures, as unambiguously provided in the statute). 
 50.  467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. at 842–43. 
 53.  Id. at 843–44. 
 54.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623; see also Englehart, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501 (finding 
that Congress “intended the whistleblower-protection provision to apply explicitly to an 
individual who falls within the definition ‘whistleblower’ [as defined in §78u-6(a)(6)]”); 
Verfuerth, 65 F. Supp. at 644 (finding “no ambiguity in the statute at all” and adopting the 
narrow interpretation). 
 55.  Berman, 801 F.3d at 146; Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6; Yang, 18 
F. Supp. 3d at 534; Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 
1106; Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *4; Ronsenblum, 984 F. Supp. 2d at 147; 
Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4. 
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interpreting the statutory language, courts have almost universally cited to 
TRW Inc. v. Andrews for the contention that “[i]t is a cardinal principle of 
statutory construction that a statute ought, upon the whole, to be construed 
that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.”56  The adherence to the principle, 
however, has led to divergent results. 
Some district courts have found the statute ambiguous on the basis of 
the “direct conflict” between §78u-6(a)(6) and §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), and 
have then chosen to protect internal disclosures concluding that the narrow 
interpretation would render §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) superfluous.57  They have 
adopted the SEC’s reading, and treated §78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) as a “narrow 
exception” to the definition of whistleblower.58  Most recently, the Second 
Circuit in Berman has concluded that while there is “no absolute conflict” 
between the two sections, there remains “a significant tension” between 
them, which renders the statute ambiguous, and warrants deference to the 
reasonable SEC interpretation.59  Asadi and the rest of the Fifth Circuit 
cases, on the other hand, have found no tension between the two sections, 
and have held that the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act only affords 
whistleblower protection to individuals who provide information to the 
SEC.60  The court in Asadi attempted to reconcile the “perceived conflict” 
between the definition section and the anti-retaliation section by attributing 
it to a misreading of the statute.61  According to the court, §78u-6(a)(6) 
delineates who is protected under the statute, while §78u-6(h)(1)(A) 
outlines what activities are protected.62  Pursuant to this reading of Section 
922, the definition provision serves as a gateway requirement that must be 
satisfied in order to seek protection under the anti-retaliation provision.  A 
court must first determine that a plaintiff is a whistleblower pursuant to 
§78u-6(a)(6), and only then apply the three-part test of §78u-6(h)(1)(A) to 
 
 56.  534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001). 
 57.  Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6; 
Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6. 
 58.  Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5; Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 532; Murray, 
2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5; Genberg, 935 F.2d at 1106; Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
WL 4444820, at *5. 
 59.  Berman, 801 F.3d at 150–51, 154–55. 
 60.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623. 
 61.  Id. at 625. 
 62.  Id. Relatedly, the court in Englehart asserted that a broad reading of the anti-
retaliation provision, inclusive of internal disclosures, “would contradict the section’s title—
’Protection of Whistleblowers.’”  2014 U.S. Dist. WL 2619501, at *8.  No such 
contradiction appears if the court adopts the SEC interpretation and assumes that §78u-
6(h)(1)(A), rather than §78u-6(a)(6) provides the definition of whistleblower for purposes of 
the anti-retaliation protection.  The court, however, fails to address the SEC interpretation 
altogether. 
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determine if the plaintiff’s actions are protected against retaliation.63 
In choosing that reading, the Asadi court focused on the term 
“whistleblower” used in the anti-retaliation provision finding it 
“significant.”64  “If Congress had elected the terms ‘individual’ or 
‘employee,’ [the broad interpretation] would follow more naturally because 
the use of such broader terms would indicate that Congress intended any 
individual or employee . . . to be protected from retaliatory actions by their 
employers.”65  The problem with that statement, however, is that it is 
almost tautological.  Had Congress used the term “individual” or 
“employee,” the statute would present no internal inconsistency and 
ambiguity, and the broad reading would be the only permissible reading.  
The Asadi court therefore only stated the obvious:  that the use of the term 
whistleblower is what presents the ambiguity that gives rise to the 
confusion.  However, the mere fact that the court may not conclude that 
Congress clearly and unambiguously intended to protect internal 
disclosures does not prove the opposite, that Congress clearly and 
unambiguously intended to only cover external disclosures. 
The Asadi court, however, contended that the narrow interpretation is 
the more logical reading of the statute, and that it would not render a 
substantial part of the anti-retaliation provision superfluous, as some of the 
district courts had argued.66  In support, it presented the hypothetical 
situation of an employee who disclosed his suspicions to the SEC and his 
employer on the same day, and got fired even though his employer was 
unaware of the SEC disclosure.67  That employee, the court reasoned, 
would be protected from retaliation against the internal disclosure under 
§78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) because, by virtue of reporting to the SEC, he was 
already a whistleblower under §78u-6(a)(6).68 
While the court managed to conceive of a scenario where the two 
sections would be reconciled, it did not advance the only reasonable 
explanation.  Rather, as argued by the court in Connolly, the two sections 
“are—at a minimum—susceptible to more than one interpretation when 
read together,” and nothing indicates that the unusual hypothetical situation 
advanced by Asadi is what Congress intended to address.69  An alternative 
 
 63.  Banko v. Apple Inc., 20 F. Supp. 3d 749, 756 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (“[T]he 
‘whistleblower protection’ provided by Section 78u-6(h) is only available to individuals 
who meet the Dodd-Frank definition of ‘whistleblower’ found in Section 78u-6(a).”). 
 64.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 626. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 627. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Connolly, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6; see also Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. 
WL 2190084, at *5 (“No doubt this reading of the two statutory provisions is permissible, 
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way to reconcile the two sections may be that adopted by Egan, Kramer, 
and Genberg; namely, that §78u-6(h)(1)(A) is a narrow exception to the 
§78u-6(a)(6) whistleblower definition.70  This interpretation, endorsed by 
the SEC, likely captures Congress’s intent better.  First, the Asadi 
interpretation addresses only a very unusual and rare set of cases.  It is 
difficult to imagine why one would choose to report a suspected violation 
internally once he has already decided to report to the SEC.  Upon 
disclosure to the SEC, the employee loses the major incentives for 
disclosing internally, such as “displaying loyalty to one’s company and 
allowing for quick, efficient, and private resolutions of violations.”71  The 
Asadi court did not claim that there had ever been such a case.  Moreover, 
as the court in Connolly acknowledged, citing to the SEC amicus brief to 
the Second Circuit, “under Asadi, ‘clause (iii) would be utterly ineffective 
as a preventative measure’ because ‘employers would not know that a 
report was made to the Commission.’”72  Even if the hypothetical example 
provides one possible explanation of the textual inconsistency, it is far from 
the clear and unambiguous display of congressional intent required by 
Chevron.73  As the Murray court concluded, “[t]he existence of these 
‘competing, plausible interpretations’ of the statutory provisions compels 
the conclusion that ‘the statutory text is ambiguous in conveying 
Congress’s intent.’”74  By presuming one possible (and arguably not the 
most reasonable) interpretation75 of the statute, the Asadi court effectively 
skipped step one of Chevron, and engaged in impermissible judicial 
lawmaking.76 
The Asadi court, however, did not end its argument by offering a way 
to reconcile the two provisions.  It also contended that the broad 
interpretation would render the definition section superfluous.77  The court 
asserted that the words “to the Commission” would be given no meaning if 
 
but . . . it is by no means mandatory.”). 
 70.  Egan, 2011 U.S. Dist. WL 1672066, at *5; Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106; 
Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *5. 
 71.  Leifer, supra note 6, at 139. 
 72.  2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5473144, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014). 
 73.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 74.  Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5. 
 75.  See Jennifer M. Pacella, Inside or Out? The Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Program’s 
Antiretaliation Protections for Internal Reporting, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 721, 745 (2014) 
(describing the Asadi interpretation as “an attempt to grasp at straws to give meaning to § 
78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii)”). 
 76.  See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (holding that when a statute has been ambiguous, and 
an administrative agency has interpreted the statute, a court may not “simply impose its own 
construction on the statute”). 
 77.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628. 
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the broad definition were adopted.78  This presents an interesting 
juxtaposition with the stance taken by the Second Circuit and the district 
courts outside the Fifth Circuit that adopting the narrow interpretation 
would render part of the anti-retaliation provision “inoperable and moot”79 
or, at best, “extremely limited [in] scope.”80  As illustrated by the SEC rule 
and the Asadi hypothetical, neither concern is completely justified.  The 
SEC rule and the Asadi hypothetical both present possible ways to 
reconcile the textual inconsistency.81  However, neither evidences that 
Congress’s intent was clear and unambiguous.  As the court in Murray 
noted, the fact that both the broad and the narrow interpretation are 
reasonable serves as evidence that the statute is ambiguous.82  And upon a 
finding of ambiguity, the court must defer to a reasonable agency 
interpretation rather than substituting its own construction.83  Even though 
the Asadi court in another section of the opinion acknowledged the SEC’s 
reading would avoid the problem by applying the narrow definition to the 
bounty program, it failed to address it when stating that the broad 
interpretation would render the definition section superfluous. 
The Asadi court also asserted that the broad definition would render 
the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protection moot.84  The court recognized 
that the greater monetary award, reduced procedural hurdles, and extended 
statute of limitations in the Dodd-Frank Act, coupled with the broad 
interpretation, would supplant the need to file under Sarbanes-Oxley.85  
Although the statement is factually correct, it does not constitute a 
persuasive argument for adoption of the narrow interpretation.  As argued 
by some courts and evidenced by legislative history, the Dodd-Frank Act 
sought to remedy the shortcomings of prior legislation, including the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and to strengthen and expand its protections.86  
 
 78.  Id.; see also Verfuerth, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5682514, at *3 (“The SEC’s 
interpretation renders an entire section of the statute superfluous, namely, the definition of 
‘whistleblower’ itself.”). 
 79.  Genberg, 935 F. Supp. 2d at 1106. 
 80.  Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *5. 
 81.  See Khazin, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 940703, at *6 (“The SEC’s rule harmonizes the 
contradictory provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act while not rendering any word or section 
superfluous.”). 
 82.  Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *5. 
 83.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 84.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 628. 
 85.  Id. at 629; Verfuerth, 2014 U.S. Dist. WL 5682514, at *4 (arguing that a broad 
construction of the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision “would essentially replicate and 
render moot the SOX whistleblower protections already in place”). 
 86.  See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4 (asserting that “the Dodd-Frank 
Act appears to have been intended to expand upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley”); 
Murray, 2013 U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013) (acknowledging that 
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“[T]hus the claimed problem is no problem at all.”87 
Another court adopting the narrow interpretation used the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act as evidence that Congress intended to limit the Dodd-Frank anti-
retaliation provision to external disclosure.88  It argued that while Dodd-
Frank sought to “improve the accountability and transparency of the 
financial system, . . . it is not the only protection available to individuals.”89  
The court advanced no justification for treating the existence of other law 
providing protections against retaliation as evidence that the Dodd-Frank 
Act should not and was not intended to broaden those protections.  In fact, 
there is at least some evidence that Dodd-Frank intended to do just that:  
strengthen and expand the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower protections.90 
One of the weakest arguments advanced by courts in finding the 
statute unambiguous addresses the structure of the statute.  The court in 
Banko adopted the narrow interpretation, reasoning that since §78u-6(a)(6), 
the definition provision, came before §78u-6(h)(1)(A), the anti-retaliation 
provision, the latter was subordinate to the former.91  The court cited no 
authority supporting the assumption that the order of the statutory text 
could be used as evidence of the order of importance.  It is even harder to 
imagine it could be used as evidence of Congress’s clear and unambiguous 
intent to attribute such order of importance to the sections of the statute. 
In light of the direct textual conflict between the definition section and 
the anti-retaliation section, the multiple ways to reconcile the 
inconsistency, and the lack of a persuasive structural argument to the 
contrary, the language of Section 922 remains ambiguous. 
B. Congressional Intent Renders the Statute Ambiguous 
In determining whether the whistleblower protection provision 
presents an ambiguity, courts should look at the legislative intent not only 
 
Congress intended to expand on the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley); Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d 
at 730 (asserting that Congress aimed at “protecting a very broad range of disclosures, 
including many to persons or entities other than the SEC”); Pacella, supra note 75, at 746 
(2014) (“Dodd-Frank expands SOX’s antiretaliation provisions to address weaknesses that 
have been revealed in the years since SOX’s enactment, thereby granting whistleblowers 
better protections than what had previously been available under the law.”). 
 87.  Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *5. 
 88.  Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 757. 
 89.  Id. at 755–57; see also Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-SN, 
2014 U.S. Dist. WL 6860583, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014), rev’d, No. 14-4626, 2015 WL 
5254916 (2d Cir. Sept. 10, 2015) (justifying its adoption of the narrow interpretation by the 
fact that it “does not leave people who inform their employers of possible securities 
violations without a remedy if their employer retaliates against them”). 
 90.  See infra Part III.B. 
 91.  Banko, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 756. 
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by analyzing the statutory text.  While both the courts adopting the broad 
interpretation and those taking the narrow approach focused on the text of 
Section 922, they largely ignored analyzing the whistleblower provision in 
light of the broader statutory context.92  Here, the economic and legislative 
history leading to the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act, as well as the 
comprehensive changes to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in accordance with the 
explicit goal of improving accountability and transparency, are instructive.  
They reveal that Dodd-Frank likely sought to protect both internal and 
external disclosures.  At a minimum, they fail to demonstrate that Congress 
clearly and unambiguously intended to limit the anti-retaliation protection 
to external disclosures as required by Chevron for adopting the narrow 
interpretation without according deference to the SEC interpretation. 
The economic crisis of 2008 came as a shock to many.93  It marked the 
conclusion of an era that had praised the ability of financial markets 
unburdened by extensive governmental oversight to self-regulate through 
the forces of the Invisible Hand.94  The market crash revealed an abundance 
of widely used business practices, ranging from imprudent to illegal, which 
resulted in the largest systemic economic failure since the Great 
Depression.95  While the severity of the economic crisis of 2008 was of 
almost unprecedented magnitude, it was not the first time in recent history 
 
 92.  By finding the whistleblower provision ambiguous in light of the statutory context, 
Yang is one of the exceptions to the stream of cases focusing entirely on the statutory text. 
18 F. Supp. 3d at 534.  The court in Kramer also considered the broad goal of the Dodd-
Frank Act, “which was to ‘improve the accountability and transparency of the financial 
system,’ and create ‘new incentives and protections for whistleblowers.’”  2012 U.S. Dist. 
WL 4444820, at *4. 
 93.  See Paul Krugman, How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 2, 
2009), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/06/magazine/06Economic-
t.html?pagewanted=all [perma.cc/V7ZF-DA2Z] (asserting that few economists predicted the 
market crash of 2008). 
 94.  See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Bantam Classics 2003) (1776) (first advancing the idea of the 
Invisible Hand:  the idea that free markets naturally promote the interest of society through 
competition); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 38 (40th ed., 2002) 
(defending the efficiency of free markets, advancing the idea of minimal government 
involvement in economics, and attributing the Great Depression to “government 
mismanagement” rather than on an inherent instability of the free markets). 
 95.  See generally SOROS, supra note 33 (characterizing the financial crisis of 2008 as 
the worst since the mid-30s, and examining the contributing factors); see also Protecting 
Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving Corporate Governance: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 225 (2009) (statement of Richard C. 
Ferlauto) (“Under the disastrous sway of deregulation and lack of accountability, corporate 
boards and executives either caused or allowed corporations to undertake unreasonable risks 
in the pursuit of short-term financial goals that were devoid of real economic substance or 
any long-term benefits.”). 
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that leading economists had been surprised by the imperfection of weakly 
regulated markets.  The failures of Enron and WorldCom in 2000 similarly 
revealed a multitude of improper business practices including unparalleled 
accounting fraud that had gone undetected for years.96 
Congress’s response was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, a major piece of 
remedial legislation aimed at strengthening governmental oversight and 
implementing comprehensive reporting incentives and structures that 
would prevent future systemic failures.97  Its goal was to provide a 
comprehensive system of external and internal checks on potentially 
unlawful business practices.  Its whistleblower provision was designed to 
achieve exactly that.98  It forbade employers to “discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate against an 
employee” who provided information or otherwise assisted in the 
uncovering of perceived securities violations.99  The anti-retaliation 
protection applied regardless of whether the employee informed (1) a 
federal agency, (2) a member or committee of Congress, or (3) “a person 
with supervisory authority over the employee.”100  Thus, it covered both 
external and internal disclosures. 
In spite of the government’s attempt to prevent another economic 
crisis through the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the market crash of 
2008 followed in less than a decade.  It led Congress to once again come 
forward with a comprehensive piece of remedial legislation attempting to 
 
 96.  See Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; 
Arthur Andersen Fires an Executive for Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/enron-s-collapse-overview-arthur-andersen-
fires-executive-for-enron-orders.html [perma.cc/3VQZ-8HGL] (“Enron was forced to 
acknowledge that improper accounting . . . had resulted in overstating its earnings by almost 
$600 million over five years.”); Simon Romero & Floyd Norris, New Disclosures From 
WorldCom May Add to Accounting Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2002), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/02/business/new-disclosures-from-worldcom-may-add-to-
accounting-scandal.html [perma.cc/A648-W5VC] (stating that WorldCom “had overstated 
pretax profits by $3.8 billion in 2001 and early [2002], and that WorldCom admitted it may 
have been tampering improperly with its reserve accounts for four years). 
 97.  Paul S. Atkins, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC 
Commissioner: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: Goals, Content, and Status of 
Implementation (Feb. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch020503psa.htm [perma.cc/3V64-XANB] (listing 
“restoring investor confidence by strengthening corporate governance” as some of the goals 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 98.  See Megan E. Mowrey, et al., Does Sarbanes-Oxley Protect Whistleblowers? The 
Recent Experience of Companies and Whistleblowing Workers Under SOX, 1 WM. & MARY 
BUS. L. REV. 431, 431 (2010) (stating that the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision was 
adopted pursuant to the broader Sarbanes-Oxley goals to “interrupt, check, and prevent 
illegal accounting practices”). 
 99.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2002). 
 100.  Id. § 1514A(a)(1). 
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improve the regulatory system governing the functioning of financial 
markets.101  Much like the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 sought to 
remedy the issues leading to the Great Depression, and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 attempted to fix the practices resulting in the burst of the Dot-
Com Bubble, the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 was designed to remedy the 
systemic flaws of financial markets and prevent another catastrophic 
failure.102  It sought to do that by strengthening and expanding the already 
existing law,103 including through its “stronger and more expansive 
whistleblower measures” as compared to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.104 
There are several reasons why Congress may have deemed the 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision inadequate.  First, the protections 
may not have been strong enough to tip the cost-benefit scales in favor of 
disclosure.  For an employee to consider disclosure viable, the high risk of 
losing his or her job and receiving no compensation would need to be offset 
by a sufficiently high probability and magnitude of protection and 
remuneration.  This calculus likely influenced Congress in enhancing the 
reporting incentives of Sarbanes-Oxley in Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower 
provision.  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act compensatory damages include:  “(A) 
reinstatement with the same seniority status that the employee would have 
had, but for the discrimination; (B) the amount of back pay, with interest; 
and (C) compensation for any special damages sustained as a result of the 
discrimination, including litigation costs, expert witness fees, and 
reasonable attorney fees.”105  While preserving the first and third 
subsections almost unaltered, Dodd-Frank doubles the back-pay 
 
 101.  See supra note 3. 
 102.  Id.; see also Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by 
Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, 
and Investment of the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 226-27 
(2009) (statement of Richard C. Ferlauto) (“It is time for America to get back on the road of 
prudent financial regulatory oversight and increased corporate accountability.”); BAIRD 
WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY (2010) (“Perhaps the major issue in 
financial reform has been how to address the systemic fragility that was revealed by the 
crisis.”). 
 103.  Leifer, supra note 6. 
 104.  Id. at 123; see also Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by 
Improving Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, 
and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 226-
27 (2009) (statement of Richard C. Ferlauto) (“In order to restore the confidence of 
investors in our capital markets, it is now necessary to take the following steps:   . . . Protect 
whistleblowers and confidential sources who expose financial fraud and other corporate 
misconduct.”); Pacella, supra note 75, at 746 (arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act sought to 
address the weaknesses of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and grant whistleblowers better 
protections). 
 105. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(c)(2) (2002). 
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compensation, thus providing a stronger incentive to disclose a violation.  
The relief under Dodd-Frank includes “(i) reinstatement with the same 
seniority status that the individual would have had, but for the 
discrimination; (ii) 2 times the amount of back pay otherwise owed to the 
individual, with interest; and (iii) compensation for litigation costs, expert 
witness fees, and reasonable attorneys’ fees.”106 
Additionally, Congress may have determined that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
180-day statute of limitations107 does not provide an adequate time window 
for whistleblowers to gather sufficient information, report the suspected 
violation, and commence an action seeking relief.  Accordingly, Dodd-
Frank extended the statute of limitations to six years from the moment the 
violation occurred or three years from the moment the employee became or 
should have become aware of the violation.108 
Lastly, Congress likely considered the procedural hurdles of Sarbanes-
Oxley to have a deterrent effect on disclosure.  Under the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, a whistleblower may only bring a case to federal district court after 
having filed a complaint with the Secretary of Labor, and under the 
condition that the Secretary has not issued a final decision within 180 
days.109  Congress completely discarded that procedural requirement in the 
Dodd-Frank Act.  Instead, a Dodd-Frank whistleblower claim may be filed 
directly in federal district court.110  These changes, coupled with the 
broader goal of the Dodd-Frank Act to remedy the market failures that led 
to the crash of 2008,111 have led many to conclude that the Dodd-Frank Act 
sought to strengthen the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.112  Apart 
from the numerous statements based on legislative history that Dodd-Frank 
 
 106. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(C) (2010). 
 107. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(D) (2002) (providing that a whistleblower may commence 
a lawsuit within 180 days of the moment the violation has occurred or the employee has 
learned of it). 
 108.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(iii)(I) (2010). 
 109.  18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1) (2002). 
 110.  15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(B)(i) (2010). 
 111.  See S. REP. No. 111-176, at 2 (2010) (asserting that the Dodd-Frank Act was “a 
direct and comprehensive response to the financial crisis that nearly crippled the U.S. 
economy beginning in 2008”); see also Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk 
Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th 
Cong. 78 (2009) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) (arguing that “the over-arching goal [of the Dodd-Frank Act was 
that] of protecting the financial system and the broader economy”). 
 112.  See Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4 (“[T]he Dodd-Frank Act appears 
to have been intended to expand upon the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley.”); Murray, 2013 
U.S. Dist. WL 2190084, at *6 (acknowledging “the congressional intent to expand on the 
protections of Sarbanes-Oxley”); Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 730 (asserting that Congress 
aimed at “protecting a very broad range of disclosures, including many to persons or entities 
other than the SEC”). 
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generally sought to expand Sarbanes-Oxley, there are arguments that the 
whistleblower protection was no exception.113  The court in Bussing 
advanced several reasons for protecting internal disclosures, arguing that 
Congress most likely did not intend to “encourage an across-the-board 
departure from the general practice of first making an internal report.”114 
In light of the market crash of 2008, the explicit goal to “promote the 
financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and 
transparency in the financial system,”115 and the marked boost of disclosure 
incentives under Dodd-Frank in accordance with that goal,116 Congress 
likely sought to build upon, strengthen and expand Sarbanes-Oxley.  
Consequently, a court may not reasonably infer that Congress clearly and 
unambiguously sought to limit the anti-retaliation protection to external 
disclosures.  Rather, the broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation 
provision is consistent with the goal of Section 922 “to motivate as many 
whistleblowers as possible to come forward with information pertaining to 
law violations.”117  Thus, a court facing the issue of internal reporting may 
not “impose its own construction on the statute,” but must adopt the SEC’s 
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.118 
C. The SEC Interpretation Is Reasonable 
Because the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision is ambiguous, a 
court must grant deference to the SEC interpretation under Chevron unless 
it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”119  The 
SEC rule must be granted controlling weight pursuant to Chevron, because 
it provides a compelling interpretation of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower 
protection that reconciles the inherent ambiguity of Section 922. 
As discussed in Part II, the SEC did not invalidate the narrow 
 
 113.  See Pacella, supra note 75, at 727 (“In addition to reforms aimed at financial 
regulation, Dodd-Frank created vast developments to incentivize and protect whistleblowers 
to come forward with information regarding possible securities law violations.”); see also 
Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 49 (2009) (statement of Paul Schott 
Stevens, President and CEO, Investment Company Institute) (“[T]he goal of systemic risk 
regulation should be to prevent or contain fires before they consume our financial system.”). 
 114.  Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (asserting that internal disclosure allows companies 
to remedy violations early on, facilitates internal compliance programs, and helps vet tips to 
the SEC). 
 115.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
 116.  See supra text accompanying notes 106-110. 
 117.  See Pacella, supra note 75, at 748. 
 118.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 119.  Id. at 844. 
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whistleblower definition of §78u-6(a)(6).120  A whistleblower seeking a 
monetary award under the bounty program must still report to the SEC to 
be eligible.121  However, the SEC clarified that a public company employee 
seeking protection from retaliation qualifies as a whistleblower upon 
meeting one of the three conditions under §78u-6(h)(1)(A).122  Therefore, 
the SEC defined three categories of whistleblowers for purposes of the anti-
retaliation provision, including public company employees who report a 
violation to a supervisor.123  The rule is in this way consistent with the 
interpretation adopted by some district courts, namely, that §78u-
6(h)(1)(A)(iii) is a “narrow exception” to the whistleblower definition of 
§78u-6(a)(6).124  It also avoids rendering any clause of the statute 
superfluous, in conformity with the surplusage cannon of construction 
espoused by TRW.125 
The Asadi court attacked the SEC interpretation on several fronts.  
Part III.A challenged most of them.  First, the suggestion that the SEC 
interpretation renders the language “to the Commission” in §78u-6(a)(6) 
meaningless was shown to be unpersuasive in light of the fact that §78u-
6(a)(6) continues to hold in full force outside of the anti-retaliation 
provision.  Second, the concern that the SEC interpretation would obviate 
the need to sue under Sarbanes-Oxley was relieved by evidence that in 
enacting Dodd-Frank Congress intended to expand the Sarbanes-Oxley 
protections. 
In addition to asserting that Section 922 is clear and unambiguous, the 
Asadi court maintained that the SEC interpretation is unreasonable and 
should be rejected because parts of the rule are inconsistent with each 
other.126  In support of that contention, the court compared the anti-
retaliation provision127 with the provision governing the procedures for 
reporting a violation to the SEC.128  According to the Asadi court, it is 
inconsistent to first define the term whistleblower as one who has provided 
 
 120.  See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
 121.  76 Fed. Reg. 34300-01, 34363 (“To be eligible for an award, you must submit 
original information to the Commission . . . .”). 
 122.  Id. at 34304 (defining three categories of whistleblowers protected from retaliation 
in accordance with §78u-6(h)(1)(A)). 
 123.  Id. (incorporating the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision covering internal 
disclosures in the Dodd-Frank anti-retaliation provision). 
 124.  Yang, 18 F. Supp. 3d at 532; Genberg, 935 F.2d at 1106; Murray, 2013 WL 
2190084, at *5; Kramer, 2012 WL 4444820, at *5; Egan, 2011 WL 1672066, at *5. 
 125.  534 U.S. at 31. 
 126.  See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (“[T]he SEC’s regulations concerning the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower-protection provision are inconsistent.”). 
 127.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1). 
 128.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9; see also Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630 (discussing inconsistencies 
in the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision). 
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information to the SEC or to a supervisor, and then to provide procedural 
requirements for submitting information to the SEC.129  The court’s 
argument is unpersuasive as there is no inconsistency between the two 
sections.  The anti-retaliation section defines the categories of 
whistleblowers, including both internal and external whistleblowers,130 
while the procedures section provides the methods for making an external 
disclosure.131  To be eligible for an award, a whistleblower must meet the 
requirements laid out in the procedures section.132  However, to be eligible 
for anti-retaliation protection, a whistleblower may—but need not—satisfy 
the procedural requirements for award eligibility.133 
Finally, as described in Part III.A, the Asadi court was able to come up 
with an alternative way to reconcile the ambiguity of Section 922.134  
However, pursuant to Chevron, where the statute is ambiguous and the 
agency has provided a reasonable interpretation, the court may not 
substitute its own interpretation for that of the agency.135  Step two of 
Chevron is not a way for the court to use its discretion and balance the 
perceived reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation against that of the 
court.  The agency’s construction must be given controlling weight unless 
it is arbitrary or capricious.136  Since the SEC rule provided a reasonable 
interpretation of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provision that reconciled 
the internal textual ambiguity, it must be granted deference and be adopted 
as the controlling interpretation on the issue. 
IV. THE NARROW INTERPRETATION RISKS ELIMINATING ALL 
INTERNAL WHISTLEBLOWING 
Apart from the legal rationales for deferring to the SEC construction 
of Section 922, I argue that adopting the broad interpretation is more 
consistent with the goals Congress sought to achieve with the enactment of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.  Limiting the protections of Section 922 exclusively 
to external disclosures risks discouraging all internal whistleblowing, thus 
stifling a goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  In light of the evidence that 
Dodd-Frank sought to strengthen and expand the protections of Sarbanes-
 
 129.  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 630.  
 130.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1). 
 131.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-9. 
 132.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2). 
 133.  17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(b)(1)(iii). 
 134.  See Asadi, 720 F.3d at 627 (presenting the hypothetical situation of an employee 
who reports internally and externally on the same day). 
 135.  Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. 
 136.  Id. at 844. 
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Oxley,137 espousing the narrow interpretation risks running against the 
intent of Congress in enacting the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act explicitly protects internal disclosures from 
retaliation.  Congress’s decision to include internal whistleblowers in the 
statute is arguably justified both in theory and in practice.  First, as a matter 
of policy, Congress may have decided to alleviate some of the burden on 
the already financially strained Securities and Exchange Commission by 
encouraging employees to report suspected violations internally.  Securities 
violations often occur as a result of weak managerial oversight rather than 
intentional law breaking by high-level management, especially in large 
companies where active involvement by top executives is impractical.138  In 
such cases, protecting internal reporting may enhance the efficiency of the 
oversight system.  Management would willingly investigate the reported 
activity and remedy the violations even in the absence of SEC 
intervention.139  That would be impossible if employees had no protections 
because of the risk and consequences of retaliation they would face when 
reporting violations to their superiors.  Whether management is actively 
involved in a suspected securities violation, and whether internal reporting 
would be fruitful, can only be determined in hindsight.  Thus, employees 
that lack a sufficiently strong set of protections from retaliation would 
forgo all internal disclosure, including such that would lead to immediate 
and effective remedial action by management.  Additionally, internal 
reporting may avoid wasting corporate and governmental resources in the 
instances where the whistleblower’s suspicions are based on a 
misunderstanding rather than an actual violation.140 
Moreover, protections for internal disclosures may be beneficial to 
SEC enforcement even where management is actively involved in the 
unlawful activity.  Empirical evidence suggests that “internal reporting is 
 
 137.  See supra text accompanying note 112. 
 138.  Protecting Shareholders and Enhancing Public Confidence by Improving 
Corporate Governance: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Insurance, and 
Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 233 
(2009) (responses to written questions of Senator Bunning from John C. Coates IV) (“As 
firms grow in size in complexity, it may not be a practical goal to expect boards or even top 
management to always know everything is going on inside the firms they run, any more than 
it is practical for officials in the U.S. Government to know everything that is going on inside 
the organization they oversee.”). 
 139.  See Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733 (“Internal reporting . . . allows companies to 
remedy improper conduct at an early stage, perhaps before it rises to the level of a 
violation.”); see also Pacella, supra note 75, at 753 (“Internal reporting provides companies 
with a number of benefits, including investigating wrongdoing in the early stages, 
evaluating the merits of reported violations, correcting problems in a timely manner, and 
avoiding any negative publicity of problems that become known to the public.”). 
 140.  Bussing, 20 F. Supp. 3d at 733. 
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the most common type of initial whistleblowing.”141  Therefore, internal 
disclosure may often be an important first step to subsequent external 
disclosure to the SEC for many employees.  Discouraging internal 
reporting does not necessarily mean that employees will be more willing to 
report directly to the SEC.  There are differences in the level of formality 
and procedural hurdles between internal and external disclosure.  Under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, for instance, to report to the SEC in the manner provided 
by the Commission, one must “either . . . submit the information online, 
through the Commission’s website, or by mailing or faxing a Form TCR 
(Tip, Complaint or Referral).”142  An employee may feel more confident 
and comfortable to share his or her suspicions with a superior, possibly in 
an informal conversation at work, rather than initiating the process of 
contacting a federal agency and following its strict procedural rules to 
report a perceived violation.  Additionally, as the Berman court noted, 
some employees may feel that reporting a suspected violation to a 
government agency creates a greater risk of retaliation than reporting to 
management in a good-faith effort to elicit company action and right the 
wrong internally.143  Thus, while an initial internal report may trigger 
additional involvement and disclosure to the SEC upon management’s 
reluctance to remedy the issue, possibly coupled with adverse action 
against the whistleblower, an employee may simply lack the willingness 
and incentives to initially report directly to the SEC.  Moreover, some 
categories of whistleblowers, such as auditors and attorneys, cannot report 
a suspected wrongdoing to the Commission until after they have reported it 
internally and awaited company response.144  Since “any retaliation would 
almost always precede Commission reporting,” such categories of 
whistleblowers would be left with virtually no Dodd-Frank protection in 
the absence of internal protections.145  Finally, Congress may also have 
been influenced by the fact that the Enron violations were largely revealed 
by internal disclosures to the company CEO Ken Lay.146  As described 
above, there are many reasons for protecting internal disclosure.  
Regardless of the justifications, however, Congress’s intent in enacting the 
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision was clear:  to protect both internal 
and external disclosures from retaliation. 
 
 141.  Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 
1760 (2007). 
 142.  Kramer, 2012 U.S. Dist. WL 4444820, at *4.  
 143.  Berman, 2015 WL 5254916, at *6. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. 
 146. Text of Watkins’ Letter to Lay After Departure of Chief Executive, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
16, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/16/business/16TEXT.html [perma.cc/2WLL-
HSYS]. 
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As discussed in more detail in Part III.B, The Dodd-Frank Act was 
enacted in response to the financial crisis of 2008, and sought to strengthen 
and expand prior law, including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Since Dodd-
Frank has been the latest say on whistleblower protections enacted to cure 
the deficiencies of prior legislation and improve “accountability and 
transparency,”147 potential whistleblowers are likely to presume that it 
provides the strongest set of protections.  Additionally, as the most recent 
federal law on whistleblowing, Dodd-Frank is likely to be perceived as 
Congress’s choice of policy on the issue.  Adopting the narrow 
interpretation, therefore, may have an important impact on prospective 
whistleblowers’ perceptions. 
The awareness that internal disclosure is not protected under Dodd-
Frank, coupled with the understanding that Dodd-Frank was designed to 
expand Sarbanes-Oxley and enhance transparency, may signal that internal 
disclosure is not protected at all.  It may thus serve as a potent deterrent 
against internal reporting.148  Research shows that fear of retaliation is 
among the most common disincentives to internal disclosure.149  An 
understanding that the law provides no protections against retaliation will 
thus have a chilling effect on internal reporting.  The inference, based on 
the timing, goal, and structure of Dodd-Frank, that internal disclosure is left 
with no protections against retaliation may not be strictly rational.  
However, it is likely.  Influenced by cognitive biases combined with 
prevalent stimuli awakening those biases, even highly trained actors engage 
in intuitive emotional decision-making.  Investors are often tricked into 
forgoing profitable investments due to loss aversion.150  Judges are 
susceptible to making objectively unreasonable decisions as a result of 
rhetoric in legal advocacy.151  Prospective whistleblowers are vulnerable to 
intuitive emotional decision-making as well.  The disincentive to internal 
 
 147.  Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
 148.  See Pacella, supra note 75, at 750 (arguing that the decision in Asadi will likely 
have a negative impact on internal disclosure of violations as it leaves whistleblowers 
“without the assurance that they may take advantage of the robust protections from 
retaliation that have become available under Dodd-Frank when they make internal reports”). 
 149.  Id. at 755 (“[T]he two most common explanations for why employees do not report 
internally are fear of retaliation and feelings of futility if they choose to report . . . .”). 
 150.  See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity 
Premium Puzzle, Q.J. ECON. 73, 74 (1995) (arguing that investors often value utility by 
defining it “over gains and losses relative to some neutral reference point, such as the status 
quo, as opposed to wealth as in expected utility theory”). 
 151.  See Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the 
Science of First Impressions to Persuade the Reader, 89 OR. L. REV. 305, 310 (2010) 
(arguing that “[t]he early sections of a brief . . . can work as primes for the case as a 
whole”). 
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disclosure often arises from perceptions rather than actuality.152  Thus, the 
perceived likelihood of retaliation influenced by and coupled with the 
perceived lack of legal protections will negatively affect internal 
disclosure.  Much like Sarbanes-Oxley,153 Dodd-Frank has already been 
attacked for undermining internal reporting by providing monetary 
incentives to whistleblowers.154  Driven by the possibility of receiving a 
hefty award, the argument goes, employees may choose to forgo internal 
compliance programs instituted to spot and remedy violations early on, and 
instead report directly to the SEC.155  If the concerns are justified, the 
combination of the bounty program and the adoption of the narrow 
interpretation risks chilling all internal whistleblowing. 
Such an outcome would run contrary to the goals of both Dodd-Frank 
and Sarbanes-Oxley.  First, it would directly interfere with the policy 
sought by Sarbanes-Oxley in adopting the whistleblower protections, 
namely, encouraging both internal and external disclosure.  In light of loss 
aversion, any ambiguity as to whether internal disclosure is protected 
would be intuitively resolved in a way that avoids risk.  The risk associated 
with reporting internally and being retaliated against will likely influence 
decision-makers to make no disclosure.  By virtue of interfering with the 
functioning of Sarbanes-Oxley, adopting the narrow interpretation would 
also run contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank “to address weaknesses that 
have been revealed in the years since SOX’s enactment,”156 thus 
“minimizing the fear of retaliation and motivating whistleblowers to come 
forward with information pertaining to securities laws violations.”157  Not 
only would adopting the narrow interpretation fail to strengthen and expand 
the protections of Sarbanes-Oxley; it would risk rendering part of it 
inoperative.  As a result, the Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provision 
would be even less effective than before the adoption of Dodd-Frank, an 
outcome contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank. 
The dangers to the effectiveness of Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley 
are amplified by several companies’ recent attempts to use contractual 
provisions to prevent external disclosures.  KBR has already agreed to pay 
a $130,000 penalty to the SEC for including non-disclosure agreements in 
 
 152.  See Jamie Darin Prenkert et al., Retaliatory Disclosure: When Identifying the 
Complainant Is an Adverse Action, 91 N.C. L. REV. 889, 929 (2013) (“Perceptions of the 
likelihood of retribution are just as important as the reality, if not more so.”). 
 153.  Spivack, supra note 32. 
 154.  Ben James, Big Awards Pushing Compliance Pros To Be Whistleblowers, LAW360, 
Apr. 23, 2015, 7:25 PM, http://www.law360.com/articles/646731/big-awards-pushing-
compliance-pros-to-be-whistleblowers [perma.cc/HDE6-BUKB]. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Pacella, supra note 75, at 741. 
 157.  Id. at 751. 
ARTICLE 6_PETKOVA 2-12.DOCX (PETKOVA) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/16  7:48 PM 
598 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 18:2 
 
its employment contracts, prohibiting employees from reporting securities 
laws violations to the government without permission from the company’s 
legal department.158  While KBR did not admit and the SEC did not find 
that the contractual provisions had in fact prevented employees from 
reporting violations to the SEC, the existence of the non-disclosure 
agreements was found sufficiently injurious to the Dodd-Frank 
whistleblower provision to warrant an enforcement action.159  The SEC is 
currently investigating a number of companies for similar violations.160  
The possibility that numerous companies may be using employment 
contracts and non-disclosure agreements to discourage employees from 
reporting externally, coupled with the possibility of adopting the narrow 
interpretation of Section 922, risks having a chilling effect on all 
whistleblowing activity.  This is an outcome Congress surely did not intend 
to cause when it enacted the Dodd-Frank Act. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Limiting the protections of Section 922 to external disclosures 
jeopardizes Congress’s goals in enacting both Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-
Frank.  First, it risks undermining the protections of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and rendering its whistleblower provision less effective than prior to 
the adoption of the Dodd-Frank Act.  Thus, it directly interferes with 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s unambiguous intent to encourage internal reporting.  As 
a result, it also runs contrary to the goal of Dodd-Frank to remedy the 
weaknesses of Sarbanes-Oxley and provide a stronger set of protections in 
order to incentivize the disclosure of securities violations.  In light of the 
statutory ambiguity, the reasonable agency interpretation, and the potential 
of the narrow interpretation to undermine the goals of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank, courts should grant deference to the SEC reading, and decide 




 158.  Brett Joshpe, SEC Sends a Message About Whistleblower Treatment, FORBES, Apr. 
2, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/sites/brettjoshpe/2015/04/02/the-sec-sends-a-message-
about-whistleblower-treatment/ [ perma.cc/4H7X-WDVB]. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  Rachel Louise Ensign, SEC Probes Companies’ Treatment of Whistleblowers, 
WALL ST. J., Feb. 25, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-probes-companies-treatment-
of-whistleblowers-1424916002 [perma.cc/UWK8-G5EW]. 
